Feb 21 – Gonzales v. Google (Does the safe harbor of CDA Section 230 shield Google from liability for encouraging users to view offending videos).
Feb 22 – Twitter v. Taamneh (Can Twitter be held liable for providing a service that aids and abets terrorism, despite its substantial non-violative uses).
March 21 – Abitron v. Hetronic (Extraterritorial application of US Trademark Law — damages from foreign sales).
March 22 – Jack Daniels v. VIP (Commercial humor leading to fair use or no-infringement/dilution in the TM context)
March 27 – Amgen v. Sanofi (Full Scope Enablement: How much description is enough to satisfy the enablement requirement).
April 17 – Slack v. Pirani (For securities liability, what causal link is required between misleading statement and the purchase of shares).
April 18 – Groff v. DeJoy (Should Title VII of the Civil Rights Act be given more teeth to protect religious liberty in the employment context).
April 19 – Counterman v. Colorado (When does speech rise to a “true threat”, unprotected by the First Amendment. Here, it was a series of unsolicited Facebook direct messages. The question is whether his intent (mens rea) matters, or can he be convicted based only upon the reasonably perceived threat of the recipient.).
April 24 – Dupree v. Younter (If SJ is denied on a question of law, must the party reassert the issue in JMOL in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Although not a patent case, this issue comes up all the time in patent litigation).
April 25 – Yegiazaryan v. Smagin (When can an injury to a foreign plaintiff’s “intangible property” serve as the basis for a RICO claim)
Upcoming Supreme Court Oral Arguments in IP & Tech Cases (patentlyo.com)
個人的に注目は、Enablementについて最高裁に上告が受理されたAmgen v. Sanofi事件でしょうか。
- March 27 – Amgen v. Sanofi (Full Scope Enablement: How much description is enough to satisfy the enablement requirement).
whether enablement is governed by the statutory requirement that the specification teach those skilled in the art to “make and use” the claimed invention, or whether it must instead enable those skilled in the art “to reach the full scope of claimed embodiments” without undue experimentation—i.e., to cumulatively identify and make all or nearly all embodiments of the invention without substantial “time and effort.”